Assignment in presentation skills

By John Podesta Recent tragic events have brought about a rapid reconsideration of the legal restrictions placed on law enforcement and the intelligence communities. On October 26, President Bush signed into law the USA Patriot Act (Patriot Act), which makes significant changes in the legal structure within which the law enforcement and intelligence communities operate. This article focuses on the key provisions of the Patriot Act that pertain to electronic surveillance and intelligence gathering. Notwithstanding the haste with which Congress acted, the provisions of the new law relating to electronic surveillance, for the most part, are a sound effort to provide new tools for law enforcement and intelligence agencies to combat terrorism while preserving the civil liberties of individual Americans. Some changes simply update our surveillance laws to reflect the fact that we live in a digital age. Other sections expand the surveillance powers of our law enforcement and intelligence communities in ways that make sense in light of the new threats facing our country. A common problem running through many of the new authorities contained in the Patriot Act is the reliance on executive branch supervision rather than meaningful review by a neutral magistrate of the potentially highly intrusive surveillance techniques that are authorized. There are several common sense changes that could be made to the new law that would provide better protections for civil liberties without sacrificing security. Because of the rapidity with which the law was enacted, Congress, wisely, included a four-year sunset of many of the provisions of the new Act. That sunset will allow Congress to make some needed adjustments, hopefully in a calmer climate, and strengthen the protections for civil liberties without sacrificing security. Section 216 The Patriot Act substantially changes the law with respect to law enforcement access to information about computer use including Web surfing. Reaching for an analogy from the old rotary dialed telephone system, the Act extends provisions written to authorize installation of pen registers and trap and trace devices, which record outgoing and incoming phone numbers, to authorize the installation of devices to record all computer routing, addressing, and signaling information. The government can get this information with a mere certification that the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. Today, with more than fifty million U.S. households online, when more than 1.4 billion e-mails change hands every day, when computer users surf the Web and download files using phone lines, mobile devices, and cable modems, the government can learn a tremendous amount of information about you from where you shop to what you read to who your friends are through the use of so-called transactional records. The potential for abuse, for invasion of privacy, and for profiling citizens is high. That’s why it is disappointing that the authors of this provision settled for an incredibly weak standard of judicial oversight. A better analogy might have been to the provision of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act governing access to the stored records of Internet service providers, which permits a judge to satisfy herself that there are specific and articulable facts that the information sought is relevant and material to the ongoing investigation. This is a provision that Congress should review as part of its sunset process and amend. Section 203 Previously, domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence collection operated on separate tracks. This separation was seen as necessary because of the very different legal regimes that are associated with domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence collection. The events of September 11, which involved several individuals who had lived in our country for some time, made it clear that more cooperation between domestic law enforcement and foreign intelligence collection was necessary. Section 203 facilitates this cooperation by allowing "foreign intelligence information" gathered in criminal investigations by domestic law enforcement to be shared with the intelligence community. In this manner, section 203 enables the intelligence community access to critical information that might otherwise be unavailable. The definition of "foreign intelligence information" contained in the Patriot Act is quite broad. Foreign intelligence is defined to mean "information relating to the capabilities, intentions, or activities of foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons or international terrorist activities." The definition goes on to specifically include information about a U.S. person that concerns a foreign power or foreign territory and "relates to the national defense or the security of the United States" or "the conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States." The sharing of such a broad range of information raises the specter of intelligence agencies, once again, collecting, profiling, and potentially harassing U.S. persons engaged in lawful, First Amendment-protected activities. Section 203 provides some protection against abuse by requiring that when information originates from grand juries or wiretaps, the attorney general must establish procedures for the disclosure of "foreign intelligence information" that identifies a U.S. person. These safeguards need to be strengthened in two regards. First, to prevent unnecessary dissemination of information about a U.S. person to the intelligence community, such procedures should also be required for information obtained in domestic criminal investigations generally. Second, information subject to grand jury secrecy rules should only be disseminated with authorization from a court. Section 206 The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) facilitates domestic intelligence gathering related to foreign powers by allowing the collection of such information without the legal restrictions associated with domestic law enforcement. Section 206 of the Patriot Act modernizes FISA wiretap authority. Previously, FISA required a separate court order be obtained for each communication carrier used by the target of an investigation. In the era of cell phones, pay phones, e-mail, instant messaging, and BlackBerry wireless e-mail devices such a requirement is a significant barrier in monitoring an individual’s communications. Section 206 allows a single wiretap to legally "roam" from device to device, to tap the person rather than the phone. In 1986, Congress authorized the use of roaming wiretaps in criminal investigations that are generally subject to stricter standards than FISA intelligence gathering, so extending this authority to FISA was a natural step. The main difference between roaming wiretaps under current criminal law and the new FISA authority is that current criminal law requires that law enforcement "ascertain" that the target of a wiretap is actually using a device to be tapped. Section 206 contains no such provision. Ensuring that FISA wiretaps only roam when intelligence officials "ascertain" that the subject of an investigation is using a device, before it is tapped, would prevent abuse of this provision. For example, without the ascertainment requirement, it is conceivable that all the pay phones in an entire neighborhood could be tapped if suspected terrorists happened to be in that neighborhood. Bringing FISA roaming wiretaps in line with criminal roaming wiretaps would prevent such abuse and provide greater protection to the privacy of ordinary Americans. Section 213 The 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act granted the government the authority to delay notification for search of some forms of electronic communications that are in the custody of a third party. Section 213 statutorily extends the ability of law enforcement to delay the notice to any physical or electronic search with a showing that notice would create an "adverse result." This provision is an effort to improve the government’s ability to investigate suspected terrorists by granting law enforcement greater leeway to operate clandestinely. To a large extent, section 213 simply codifies existing law enforcement practice in a manner consistent with recent court decisions. Nevertheless, the "adverse result" standard (defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705), by virtue of its ambiguity, creates the potential for abuse. As a result, section 213, which is not currently subject to the four-year sunset contained in the Act, should, nevertheless, be carefully reviewed at that time. Section 217 If someone unlawfully enters your home, you can ask the police to enter your premise without a warrant to investigate. Section 217 clarifies that similar authority applies to "computer trespassers." This allows law enforcement, with the permission of the owner of a computer, to monitor a trespasser’s action without obtaining an order for a wiretap. Although most law-abiding computer users’ online activities will not be monitored by the government as a result of section 217, the new authority may be overbroad. A "computer trespasser" is defined as anyone who accesses a protected computer (which includes any computer connected to the Internet) without authorization. Individuals who exceed their terms of service agreements with their Internet service provider or individuals who use their computer at work to download an MP3 file could be subject to intrusive government monitoring. While the need to respond quickly to malicious hacking, such as denial of service attacks, provides a basis for this provision, section 217 should be amended to require court authorization for monitoring of individual users that exceeds forty-eight hours in duration. Section 218 Prior to the enactment of FISA in 1978, the intelligence community had virtually unchecked authority to conduct domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens and organizations. FISA created a special court to ensure that "the purpose" of domestic intelligence gathering was to obtain foreign intelligence information. The FISA court structure and sole purpose standard attempted to balance the need to collect foreign intelligence information without the constraints of the Fourth Amendment with increased protections for Americans exercising their First Amendment rights. But the sole purpose test has created operational difficulties for foreign intelligence investigations that uncover criminal wrongdoing and lead to an investigation of the criminal conduct. The events of September 11 further blur the line between foreign intelligence investigation and domestic law enforcement and the ability to jointly work the case and share information between the intelligence and law enforcement communities has become more important in the context of the investigations of Al Qaeda. Section 218 loosens the standard of a FISA investigation by requiring a showing that the collection of foreign intelligence information is "a significant purpose" rather than "the purpose" of an investigation. Section 218 is an important tool for counterterrorism but, since probable cause is not required under FISA, it also raises the possibility that U.S. citizens who are not terrorists could have their homes searched and communications monitored without probable cause. Therefore, section 218 deserves special attention when it expires in four years. Conclusion Many of the electronic surveillance provisions in the Patriot Act faced serious opposition prior to September 11 from a coalition of privacy advocates, computer users, and elements of high-tech industry. The events of September 11 convinced many in that coalition and overwhelming majorities in Congress that law enforcement and national security officials need new legal tools to fight terrorism. But we should not forget what gave rise to the original opposition—many aspects of the bill increase the opportunity for law enforcement and the intelligence community to return to an era where they monitored and sometimes harassed individuals who were merely exercising their First Amendment rights. Nothing that occurred on September 11 mandates that we return to such an era. If anything, the events of September 11 should redouble our resolve to protect the rights we as Americans cherish. Therefore, as the new powers granted under the Patriot Act begin to be exercised, we should not only feel more confident that our country has the tools to be safe but we should be ever vigilant that these new tools are not abused. John Podesta is a visiting professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center. He served as President Clinton’s chief of staff from 1998-2001.

Privacy Guidelines
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, 1980

[From "Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data," OECD, 1980.]

1. Collection Limitation.There should be limits to the collection of personal data and any such data should be obtained by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data subject.
2. Data quality principle. Personal data should be relevant to the purposes for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up-to-date.
3. Purpose specification. The purposes for which personal data are collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of purpose.
4. Use limitation principle. Personal data should not be disclosed, made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified in accordance with Paragraph 9 except:

   (a) with the consent of the data subject; or

   (b) by the authority of law.

5. Security safeguards principle. Personal data should be protected by reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorized access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data.
6. Openness principle. There should be a general policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to personal data. Means should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of personal data, and the main purposes of their use, as well as the identity about usual residence of the data controller.
7. Individual participation principle. An individual should have the right:

   (a) to obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation of whether or not the data controller has data relating to him;

   (b) to have communicated to him, data relating to him

   1. within a reasonable time;
   2. at a charge, if any, that is not excessive;
   3. in a reasonable manner; and
   4. in a form that is readily intelligible to him;

   ( c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and

   (d) to challenge data relating to him and, if the challenge is successful, to have the data erased; rectified, completed or amended.

8. Accountability principle. A data controller should be accountable for complying with measures which give effect to the principles stated above.

Last Midterm Activity

About Privacy International

Privacy International (PI) is a human rights group formed in 1990 as a watchdog on surveillance and privacy invasions by governments and corporations. PI is based in London, England, and has an office in Washington, D.C. We have campaigned across the world to protect people against intrusion by governments and corporations that seek to erode this fragile right. We believe that privacy forms part of the bedrock of freedoms, and our goal has always been to use every means to preserve it.

Privacy =from Latin privatus 'separated from the rest, deprived of sth, esp. office, participation in the government', from privo 'to deprive') is the ability of an individual or group to seclude themselves or information about themselves and thereby reveal themselves selectively. The boundaries and content of what is considered private differ among cultures and individuals, but share basic common themes. Privacy is sometimes related to anonymity, the wish to remain unnoticed or unidentified in the public realm. When something is private to a person, it usually means there is something within them that is considered inherently special or personally sensitive. The degree to which private information is exposed therefore depends on how the public will receive this information, which differs between places and over time. Privacy can be seen as an aspect of security — one in which trade-offs between the interests of one group and another can become particularly clear

Privacy Laws & Business

Privacy Laws & Business - successfully helping organisations to integrate data protection and privacy law into good business practice since 1987.

Privacy Laws & Business provides an independent privacy laws information service to many of the world’s largest companies, specialist lawyers and has clients in over 45 countries. In the United Kingdom, the company provides services to help its private and public sector clients comply with both the Data Protection Act and the Freedom of Information Act. We show management why and how a positive response to the issues underlying privacy laws provides not only a competitive advantage, and a way of building and sustaining customer trust, but also a driver of their business strategy.

MIDTERM QUIZ

4. Your friend just told you that he is developing a worm to attack the administrative systems at your college. The worm is "harmless" and will simply cause a message - "Let's party!" - to be dispalyed on all workstations on Friday afternoon at 3 p.m. By 4 p. m., the virus will erase itself and destroy all evidence of its presence. What would you say or do?

Ans=As a friend ,I will tell him that the harmless virus he developed to attack the administration system at my college is not good,although it is harmless,it cause disturbances.And that kind of virus will affect all of student in that college,and some computer will be damage or destroy if you continue your plan,and you will pay all damages you have done,because i will tell the police of what you have done,because it is not good.

3. You are the CFO (Chief Finance Officer) of a midsized manufacturing firm. You have heard nothing but positive comments about the new CIO (Chief Information Officer) you hired three months ago. As you observe her outline what needs to be done to improve the firm's computer security, you are impressed with her energy, enthusiasm, and presentation skills. However, your jaw drops when she states that the total cost of computer security improvements will be 300, 000 dollars. This seems like a lot of money for security, given that your firm has no major incident. Several other items in the budget will either have to be dropped or trimmed back to accommodate this project. In addition, the 300, 000 dollars is above your spending authorization and will require approval by the CEO. This will force you to defend the expenditure, and you are not sure how to do this. You wonder if this much spending on security is really required. How can you sort out what really needs to be done with out appearing to be micromanaging or discouraging the new CIO?

ANS=As a CFO I will call a meeting of all board of members of that kinds of problem because it is not an easy problem,the company spending much of money for computer security improvements,and 300,000 dollars is much spending,and we will have to get a permission to the CEO if he or she will approve of that big amount.And we will explain carefully to the CIO that we will not gave him the amount he request.Then, we gave him a money but not the amount he requested, maybe less of amount we gave it to him.